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ABSTRACT
Military ecocide, the destruction of the natural environment in the course of fighting or preparing 
for war, has a long history and remains a regular feature of contemporary conflicts. Efforts to prohibit 
this in international law were initiated after the US’ notorious defoliation campaign in the Vietnam 
War in the 1960s and have advanced since then. Legal ambiguities and the defence of military 
necessity have limited the application of this body of law but the proscription of ecocide has, 
nonetheless, progressed and looks set to develop further. Normative change driven by scientists, 
environmentalists and legal experts has raised awareness of and stigmatised such practises to the 
extent that recourse to the worst excesses of ecocide now appears to have lessened and some 
recompense for past crimes has been made. Military activities, though, still inflict a heavy cost on 
the environment.
1. Introduction
This article provides an historical overview of the pro-
gression of international legal efforts to prohibit military 
ecocide, the deliberate or inadvertent destruction of the 
natural environment in the course of fighting or preparing 
for war. Ecocide is a term that has also come to be applied 
in reference to the criminal and industrial destruction 
of the environment – such as in illegal deforestation or 
dumping of toxic waste at sea – but this review will confine 
itself to militarily induced degradation. There is a long 
history of military-induced environmental degradation 
and it is a facet of warfare that has, in general, worsened 
over time with the advent of more devastating and poison-
ous forms of weaponry. In stark illustration of how both 
the politics of international security and industrialisation 
have traditionally been played out, such devastation has 
often been justified on the grounds of military necessity 
in ways that could not so readily be done if the casualties 
were human, where a large body of international law offers 
some restraint. The perennial problem of the natural envi-
ronment being valued only instrumentally – for its human 
utility – rather than intrinsically, has been apparent in 
the recourse to military strategies such as scorching the 
earth, altering freshwater supplies or chemical deforesta-
tion throughout history.
However, many and an increasing number of people 
do value the environment for its own sake, as evidenced 
by the rise of ecocentric domestic policy since the 1960s. 
In particular, many people have come to be convinced of 
the need for ecocentric restraints on human behaviour 
through scientific evidence. Despite the popular imagery 
of mystic, tree-hugging hippies, it should not be forgotten 
that the green movement in the 1960s was kick-started by 
the emergence of ground-breaking, rational and convinc-
ing scientific evidence. In particular, U.S. marine biologist 
Rachel Carson’s magnum opus Silent Spring proved that the 
widespread use of organochlorine pesticides in the fight 
against disease-carrying and crop-consuming insects, 
following their discovery in the 1940s, was also polluting 
streams and killing wildlife (Carson, 1962). As a conse-
quence of this, these activities, though serving human 
interests, began to be constrained in the U.S. and then 
elsewhere. Whilst military ecocide continues to feature 
in military campaigns, the legal and normative prohibi-
tion of such practices has advanced, in roughly the same 
timescale as the advance of ecologism, again largely due 
to the efforts of scientists and campaigners in highlighting 
the issue to a horrified public.
2. The history of militarily induced 
environmental damage
The wilful destruction of nature in the course of war can 
occur both as an offensive or defensive strategy.
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2  P. HoUgH
The application of herbicides was far more widespread 
in the Vietnam War, with an estimated 80 million litres 
of 2,4,5-T (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid), 2,4-D 
(2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid), picloram and caco-
dylate blended in a variety of mixtures – including the 
notorious Agent Orange – and sprayed on jungle foliage 
from military aircraft between 1962 and 1971 in the most 
infamous ever systematic military assault on the envi-
ronment. American scientists have estimated that 10% 
of Vietnam’s inland forests, 36% of her mangrove forests 
and 3% of cultivated land were affected by the programme 
codenamed ‘Operation Ranch Hand’ (NAS, 1974, pp. 5, 
6). This scale of ecological damage indirectly affected the 
health of millions of Vietnamese by reducing the quality 
of their nutritional intake and creating internally displaced 
persons susceptible to disease. More clearly deadly were 
the cases of direct poisoning by herbicides. In particular 
dioxin, which arises as a by-product in the manufacture 
of 2,4,5-T, is one of the most toxic chemicals known, an 
estimated 170  kg of which was sprayed over Vietnam 
and the neighbouring countries of Laos and Cambodia 
(NAS, 1974, pp. vii–9). Dioxin is severely toxic in sev-
eral dimensions. It is teratogenic (causes birth defects), 
hepatotoxic, mutagenic, carcinogenic, a skin irritant and 
known to increase cholesterol levels in blood. Many stud-
ies have linked instances of such symptoms amongst South 
Vietnamese residents and their offspring with the spray-
ings between 1962 and 1971 (Franklin, 2003). As is in 
the nature of toxicology, and particularly carcinogenicity 
and teratogenicity, proving causal factors is difficult but 
myriad cases have documented spontaneous abortions 
and infant deformities. The evidence, though, is com-
pletely unambiguous with regard to liver damage due to 
dioxin exposure. A study led by Do Thuc Trinh found that 
‘chronic hepatitis was more than ten times as prevalent 
among those subjects who had been directly exposed to 
military herbicides (more than a decade previously) than 
amongst those who had not’ (Westing, 1984, p. 166).
Despite some initial uncertainties in the scientific data 
relating to dioxin exposure, the US’s defoliation cam-
paign in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was quickly and 
roundly condemned by the American scientific commu-
nity and many international statesmen. The American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in 1969 set 
up a Herbicide Assessment Commission to investigate the 
effects of Operation Ranch Hand made up of four leading 
domestic scientists, of whom the most prominent voice to 
emerge was Arthur Westing. Westing’s background was 
as a Botanist and Forest Ecologist but the fact that he had 
also served in the U.S. military, seeing action as an artillery 
officer in the Korean War, equipped him with insights 
into both sides of the military-environment equation. 
Westing became the best known academic critic of the 
2.1. Offensive ecocide
The ‘scorched earth’ destruction of the crops and livestock 
of an enemy is a strategy that has been deployed in wars 
since ancient times. It is a method that has formed part 
of many international conquests, such as in the Roman 
sacking of Carthage, and also in the course of domestic 
counter-insurgency campaigns, such as in the Norman’s 
‘Harrying of the North’ after annexing England in the elev-
enth century. In the modern era, similar methods were still 
being employed by U.S. in the Philippines from 1898 to 
1902 to undermine nationalist resistance, much of which 
was from jungle-based guerrilla units, after having seized 
the islands from the Spanish. Domestic alarm at how an 
intervention, initially sold to the American public as lib-
erating the Filipinos from Spanish tyranny, had become 
a typically brutal colonisation prompted criticism from 
prominent quarters, with the likes of former President 
Grover Cleveland, business tycoon Andrew Carnegie 
and literary great Mark Twain expressing outrage at 
Roosevelt’s war as part of the American Anti-Imperialist 
League established in 1898. Twain articulated his horror 
in the form of a mock prayer, calling on God to ‘help us 
to turn them out roofless with little children to wander 
unfriended the wastes of their desolated lands in hunger 
and thirst’ (Twain, 2016).
With the advent of synthetic organochlorine pesticides, 
offensive ecocide was able to move beyond the razing of 
food sources to include the tactical destruction of tree 
cover utilised by insurgent guerrilla forces. The British 
were the first to undertake a strategy of ‘industrialised 
chemical defoliation’ in wartime in the early 1950s during 
the ‘Malayan Emergency’. The acidic herbicide formula-
tions 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D (later combined in Agent Orange 
used by the U.S. in Vietnam) were used to clear lines of 
communication and wipe out food crops in the struggle 
against communist insurgents. With Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI) providing the technical advice, British and 
Malayan troops in 1952 despatched fire engines spraying 
mixtures of these herbicides along a number of key roads. 
The strategy was not successful and after seven months, 
it proved more effective, both economically and practi-
cally, to remove vegetation by hand and the spraying was 
stopped. The following year, though, saw the use of her-
bicides as an aid to fighting the guerrillas restarted with 
the more traditional goal of destroying food crops grown 
by the communist forces in jungle clearings (Connor & 
Thomas, 1984). The environmental costs of this British 
ecocide are unclear. Since this episode predated Silent 
Spring and the environmental era, the sorts of scientific 
studies which later highlighted the environmental and 
health damage resulting from similar spraying operations 
10 years later in Vietnam, never took place.
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gLobaL SEcUrity: HEaLtH, SciENcE aNd PoLicy  3
U.S. defoliation campaign in Vietnam which he described 
as causing ‘widespread, long-lasting and severe disrup-
tions of perennial croplands, and of farmlands – that is 
to say of millions of hectares or the natural resource base 
essential to an agrarian society’ (Westing, 1989, p. 337). 
Westing’s writings also advocated the need to criminalise 
and prosecute such acts, notably highlighted in the 1974 
article, ‘Proscription of Ecocide’:
…  what is urgently required at this time is the estab-
lishment of the concept that widespread and serious 
ecological debilitation – so called ecocide – cannot be 
condoned. (Westing, 1974, p. 26)
Westing here utilised the term ‘ecocide’ probably first 
employed by fellow U.S. scientist Arthur Galston in 1970. 
Galston was a biologist central to the discovery of the 
defoliant qualities of 2,4,5-T who became alarmed at how 
his work had come to be put into practice and wrote crit-
ically about how Operation Ranch Hand was destroying 
Vietnamese river ecosystems (Cook, Heseltine, & Galston 
1970). Continued pressure by the Herbicide Assessment 
Commission, including a petition signed by 5000 scien-
tists (of whom 17 were holders of Nobel prizes), led to the 
termination of the campaign in 1971, fuelled in particular 
by public horror at evidence of appalling birth defects 
occurring in the South Vietnamese population (Hay, 1982, 
p. 151).
Criticism of U.S. ecocide, though, did not end with 
the termination of Operation Ranch Hand. In particu-
lar, high-profile international political expression was 
given to the crime of military ecocide when Swedish 
Prime Minister Olaf Palme, after meeting Westing for a 
briefing on the subject, used this term to denounce the 
Vietnam defoliation programme, indirectly at the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(UNCHE) at Stockholm. Palme did not explicitly cite the 
U.S. in condemning environmental warfare at UNCHE, 
but then did so overtly in several speeches in the following 
months (Hay, 1982, p. 165). The U.S. administration man-
aged to use the threat of pulling out of UNCHE to avert 
any direct reference to Operation Ranch Hand in the offi-
cial principles and paperwork that came out of the confer-
ence, but Palme’s continued criticism prompted Nixon to 
suspend full diplomatic relations with Stockholm for sev-
eral months, an extraordinary situation for two Western 
democracies to find themselves in.
No compensation has ever been forthcoming for any 
of the Vietnamese, Cambodian or Laotian victims of birth 
deformities, liver damage or other ailments attributable 
to Operation Ranch Hand. The Cambodian Government 
attempted to claim compensation for damage done in 
Kompong Cham province but the case dissolved when 
that regime was overthrown in 1970. The only victims 
compensated for illnesses attributable to ‘Operation Ranch 
Hand’, are soldiers who fought on the side responsible. 
War veterans from the U.S., Australia and New Zealand, 
who have suffered subsequent skin and liver disorders or 
birth defects in their offspring, won a long battle for com-
pensation in 1979, when a U.S. Federal Judge ruled that 
they could sue the companies responsible for manufactur-
ing Agent Orange. Over 45,000 people have since claimed 
a share of the $180 million in damages from Dow and six 
other chemical firms. Dow agreed to the settlement in the 
face of public pressure and mounting legal costs, but have 
always denied that the various illnesses incurred by the 
veterans were directly related to Agent Orange and other 
herbicide mixtures sprayed in Vietnam.
Despite the controversy of Operation Ranch Hand, U.S. 
ecocide in Vietnam also served to inspire other govern-
ments and armed groups engaged in conflicts in wood-
land or arid terrain susceptible to tactical manipulation. 
Mimicking the tactics used in Vietnam, the Indonesian 
Government in the late 1960s conducted what has been 
asserted to be the biggest deforestation in history to quell 
insurgencies in Borneo and West Kalimantan (Peluso & 
Vandergeest, 2011). Similarly, the 1980s civil war in El 
Salvador saw the government bomb agricultural lands and 
forests in seeking to deny guerrilla forces a base and sus-
tenance. Partly as a consequence of this, El Salvador today 
is virtually deforested. In a different form of domestic eco-
cide, Saddam added to his long list of environmental and 
human crimes deliberate desertification in diverting the 
courses of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates in order to drain 
marshland areas that were home to the Shia ‘Marsh Arabs’, 
after they had initiated an uprising against his rule after 
the Gulf War in 1991. This act of ecological ethnic cleans-
ing drained around 90% of the region’s marshes and also 
depleted its population from 250,000 to around 40,000 
(Weinstein, 2005, p. 715). Saddam’s ‘hydro-terrorism’ 
doubtless served as an inspiration to ISIS who, in 2015, 
dammed sections of the Euphrates in order to dehydrate 
opponents in the Syrian Civil War.
2.2. Defensive ecocide
The ‘backs to the wall’ tactic of destroying your own 
resources to prevent an invading enemy making use of 
them is also a well-established military strategy. Perhaps 
most famously, Russian forces in 1812 retreated from the 
invading French army whilst destroying their own ara-
ble lands in an ultimately successful strategy that paved 
the way for Napoleon’s disastrous ‘retreat from Moscow’, 
which sowed the seeds of his downfall. The Russian strat-
egy was learned from British military leader Wellington 
who two years earlier, in alliance with Portuguese guerrilla 
forces, had resisted a French invasion in the Peninsular 
War in a similar manner. French military power was build 
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4  P. HoUgH
during the Lebanon War (CoE, 2011). Similarly, in the 
1999 Kosovan War, NATO included amongst its strate-
gic bombing targets several chemical plants and fossil 
fuel facilities which would inevitably pollute waterways 
and cause other forms of environmental damage. The 
campaign led to the significant pollution of the Danube 
and also released toxic and carcinogenic chemicals into 
the ground and air. Most notorious was the targeting of 
the major Serbian petrochemical and fertiliser plants at 
Pancevo. NATO acknowledged the environmental conse-
quences of the strikes but asserted that military necessity 
justified some collateral fallout since the plants were a key 
source of the Serb regime’s power. Longer lasting forms 
of environmental and human damage from the Kosovan 
War bombings and other recent campaigns such as in 
Iraq have come from contamination resulting from the 
U.S. and U.K. use of the radioactive and highly persis-
tent chemical ‘depleted uranium’ to coat munitions shells. 
Greenhouse gasses, CFCs, mercury, sulphur dioxide and 
nitrous oxide emissions are also now part of the common 
collateral damage of contemporary bombing campaigns 
(Sanders, 2009, pp. 71, 72).
Battlefield destruction can also render arable land and 
other natural resources useless to humanity and other 
life forms. In addition to the pollution and defoliation, 
millions of craters today mark the agricultural belts of 
Vietnam and Laos as a consequence of a combination of 
deliberate and collateral military actions by the U.S. in the 
1960s. Many French and Belgian World War One battle-
fields remain barren today nearly a century on. Resource 
depletion through over-utilisation is another typical 
consequence of war. The appropriation of food and fuel 
by invading troops is the most predictable form of this 
phenomenon, but too much strain can also be put on the 
home resources of the invading forces. Environmental 
degradation can also occur more indirectly as a result 
of sudden influxes of refugees fleeing war. For example, 
38 sq km of forest in Kivu Province of Congo DR were 
lost within three weeks of the arrival of Rwandan refu-
gees fleeing genocide in the mid-1990s (UNEP, 2002). As 
well as being worsened deliberately, deforestation can be 
accelerated as a consequence of countries trying literally to 
rebuild their country after a conflict. Many Iraqi city trees 
were felled for fuel in the aftermath of the US-led invasion 
of 2003 and it is also known that Afghan water supplies 
and vegetation were seriously damaged and depleted fol-
lowing the onset of war in 2001 (CoE, 2011; Sheehan, 
2003). Animals, of course, are frequent casualties of war. 
Gorilla numbers in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
are known to have fallen as a consequence of that coun-
try’s persistent civil conflict, both through direct killings 
and more indirectly as a result of the destruction of their 
habitat through deforestation (Kalpers, 2001). Collateral 
on its arable supremacy, allowing her to feed the biggest 
army in Europe, and this had come to be realised by those 
on the receiving end of her autarky.
Whilst, by the twentieth century, industrial rather 
than arable might had become the main determinant of 
military power, scorching the earth could still serve its 
purpose. During the Second World War, the British took 
responsibility for rendering uninhabitable the islands of 
Norway’s Svalbard archipelago (Spitsbergen) in order to 
limit German interest in its coalfields (despite Norwegian 
opposition). Consequently, the German presence on the 
Arctic islands was limited to the manning of some weather 
stations. In a different and more dramatic form of defen-
sive ecocide, the Yellow River was deliberately flooded in 
1938 by the Chiang Kai-shek government in resisting the 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria. In doing so, the Chinese 
succeeded in slowing down the invaders by creating a 
bigger barrier and destroying potential food supplies 
but achieved this at the cost of the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of their own citizens and the homes of millions 
more. More recently, defensive ecocide, more spiteful than 
strategic, featured in the Gulf War when Saddam’s forces 
set fire to several oil wells whilst retreating from Kuwait 
in 1991, some of which continued to burn for several 
months. Oil was also deliberately leaked into the Persian 
Gulf by the Iraqi troops.
3. Collateral damage: indirect military 
environmental degradation
Environmental degradation due to war can also occur 
more indirectly as a result of the general destruction of 
battle. The aforementioned 1938 Manchurian war was, in 
fact, a multi-faceted environmental (and human) horror 
show. The Japanese used chemical and biological weap-
onry in a brutal invasion and then, once their defeat in 
the Second World War became apparent, abandoned 
much of the remaining munitions across north-eastern 
China to prevent them falling into allied hands. Shells 
containing chemicals such as mustard gas and phosgene 
were dumped in fields, lakes and streams prompting a 
slow-burning public health disaster in which thousands of 
Chinese people have subsequently died or been disabled 
in the decades that have since passed.
Elsewhere during World War Two, ‘total war’ bomb-
ings were of such a scale and nature that environmen-
tal catastrophes were, of course, inevitable. However, 
in spite of the revival of limited and just war principles 
since then, ‘collateral ecocide’ has still been apparent in 
the supposedly more strategic strikes of recent conflicts. 
In 2006, for example, between 20 and 30,000 tonnes of oil 
polluted a large stretch of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea 
and coastline after Israel bombed the Jiyeh Power Station 
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gLobaL SEcUrity: HEaLtH, SciENcE aNd PoLicy  5
& Voytekhovsky, 2010, p. 20). Environmental damage was 
also inflicted on parts of the Soviet empire during the cold 
war. For example, Soviet military camps occupied nearly 
2% of Estonia and left behind significant pollution in that 
country on their withdrawal in 1994. No compensation for 
water and soil pollution by oil, cadmium, lead, uranium 
and general waste was ever paid in a clean-up that the 
Estonian Government claimed cost them $4 billion (Auer, 
2004, pp. 119–121).
U.S. militarism at home and particularly in its over-
seas outposts has also carried significant environmental 
costs. Again in the Philippines, realpolitik and imperial 
neglect saw the Subic Bay naval base become the scene of 
a notorious ecological disaster which included the wilful 
pollution of side-stepping sewage treatment and allow-
ing human waste to be dumped directly into the sea. The 
Philippine Government claimed compensation for such 
pollution but the Americans never paid and abandoned 
the base in 1991 whilst pointing to the 1947 Military Bases 
Agreement between the two countries absolving them of 
any legal responsibility. In domestic politics, American 
military exceptionalism is also apparent with the Pentagon 
killings of wildlife can also occur in the context of mili-
tary preparation. Peacetime NATO naval exercises off the 
south coast of Spain, for instance, are known to have killed 
at least 15 beached whales in 2002 (CoE, 2011)(Figure 1).
4. The militarisation of the environment
As the case of the whale fatalities in the NATO exercise 
case illustrates, it is not just actual war which can prompt 
environmental damage but the whole phenomenon of 
defence and military preparation. The scale and nature 
of the cold war defence greatly intensified the traditional 
ecological side effects associated with this. The rise of 
nuclear weapons testing, mass military exercises and the 
global proliferation of military bases came with signifi-
cant costs, many of which are continuing to be counted. 
The Soviet testing of nuclear weapons and dumping of the 
waste from this was particularly extensive in its peripheral 
regions such as the northern reaches of Siberia. At least 
130 tests were carried out in the Soviet Arctic between 
1955 and 1970, prompting landslides as well as depositing 
radioactive material in the soil, water, ice and air (Glasby 
514-512 BC  Scythians defending against invading Persians (Darius) 
146 BC   3rd  Punic Wars: Romans on Carthage, to subjugate after military defeat 
52 BC  Gallic Wars: Gauls (Vercingetorix) defending against invading Romans 
1069-70   ‘Harrying of the North’: Normans (William) against English uprising  
1414  ‘Hunger Wars’: Teutonic Knights (Germanic crusaders) invading Poland-Lithuania 
1565  Great Siege of Malta: Crusaders resisting Turkish invasion 
1581  2nd Desmond Rebellion: English settlers suppressing Irish rebellion in Munster 
1644  30 Years War: Swedes (Torstensson) in invading Denmark 
1679  Mughal-Maratha Wars:  Marathas of India (Shivaji) against Mughal Empire 
1708-09  Great Northern War:  Russians defending against invading Swedes (Charles XII) 
1810  Peninsular War: British and Portuguese in defending against French invasion 
1812  ‘Retreat from Moscow’: Russians defending against French invasion 
1812-13  South American War of Independence: Argentine patriots defending against Spanish / Royalists 
1817-18  Sri Lankan Great Rebellion- British colonial suppression of uprising 
1864  ‘March to the Sea’: US Unionists (Sherman) against Confederates in the Civil War. 
1867-69 US (Sherman) extermination of the Buffalo to subjugate native Americans 
1898-1902  US-Philippine War: US colonial suppression of uprising  
1900  2nd Boer War: British against Boers in power struggle over South Africa 
1922  Greco-Turk War:  Greeks in Western Anatolia in retreat 
1938  Manchurian War:  Chinese flooding in defending against Japanese invasion 
1938  Manchurian War:  Japanese dumping of chemical weapons   
1941  World War Two:  Soviets in defending against German invasion 
1941  World War Two:  British in Spitsbergen to render useless to German invasion 
1944-5  World War Two:  Germans in retreat from Soviets in Northern Norway and Finland 
1952  ‘Malayan Emergency’: British and Malayan government suppressing leftist insurgency 
1962-69  Vietnam War: US intervention against leftist insurgency 
1967  Indonesia government suppression of insurgencies in Borneo and West Kalimantan  
1980-90  Salvadoran Civil War: government suppression of leftist insurgency 
1981-2  Guatemalan Civil War: government suppression of leftist insurgency   
1990  Gulf War:  Iraq (Saddam) in retreat from Kuwait 
1991  Iraqi government (Saddam) suppression of uprising by ‘Marsh Arabs’ 
1999  East Timorese secession from Indonesia: pro-government militia in retreat 
1999  Kosovan War: pollution from NATO bombing of Serbia 
1999-2009  Chechen Wars- pollution from Russian bombing 
2003-08  Darfur Crisis:  Sudanese government and Janjaweed militia against Darfurians 
2006  Lebanon War: pollution from Israeli bombing 
2006-09  Sri Lankan Civil War: government suppression of Tamil insurgency 
2011  Libyan Civil War:  Government (Gadaffi) suppression of rebels in Benghazi. 
2014-15  Syrian Civil War: Insurgents (ISIS) river diversion against government and slashed earth v Kurds.
Figure 1. timeline of some major incidences of environmental damage in war.
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6  P. HoUgH
around a quarter of the world’s jet fuel, 9% of its iron 
and steel consumption and employed 20% of its scientists 
(Ostling, 1992, p. 8). Given that, two decades on, global 
military expenditure has significantly increased, it must be 
assumed that this ecological footprint is now even greater.
5. History of international treaties and laws to 
address military ecocide
A body of international law proscribing military ecocide 
has steadily advanced since the 1970s; but in a predictable 
illustration of traditional national security trumping envi-
ronmental concerns, there is little precedent for enforcing 
this legislation. Explicit references to the ‘environment’ 
were not made in the war laws of the Geneva or Hague 
Conventions prior to the 1970s, despite their extensive 
evolution since the nineteenth century (Figure 2). The sec-
ond Hague Convention of 1907 though does declare ille-
gal military methods which ‘destroy or seize the enemy’s 
property, unless such destruction or seizure be impera-
tively demanded by the necessities of war’. In more general 
terms, the centuries old tradition of Just War, upon which 
the Geneva and Hague Conventions are built, can be seen 
as helping safeguard the environment since the notion of 
‘limited war’, which proscribes the escalation of conflicts 
beyond their specific purposes and acts of pure retribution 
and spite, logically must also apply to the destruction of 
exempted from being reported on by the Environmental 
Protection Agency and, hence, never having been held 
accountable for known instances of pollution by solvents, 
fuels and munitions near military bases well above state 
limits (Schettler, 1995).
In a different facet of ecocide, the military securitisa-
tion of the environment can sometimes take the form of 
a kind of ‘nationalisation of nature’ with wild badlands 
forcibly tamed. Tropical woodlands have regularly fea-
tured in security politics as both the arenas and symbols 
of resistance. Much of the resistance to the Japanese 
invasions in South-East Asia during the Second World 
War was jungle-based and this also came to be the stage 
for resisting European colonial rule after 1945. Hence, 
as well as carrying out deforestation for tactical reasons, 
many governments consciously came to construct their 
woodland as ‘jungle’ so as to invoke notions of lawlessness, 
danger and insecurity that required the assertion of sov-
ereign control through enforced land purchases, coerced 
population movements and the establishment of perma-
nent military bases (Peluso & Vandegeest, 2011). This was 
very much the case with the aforementioned governmen-
tal deforestations in Indonesian and El Salvadoran.
In a more general sense, it should always be remem-
bered that there is a significant ecological side effect to 
the sheer existence of the military-industrial complex. A 
study in the 1990s found that the military accounted for 
C3rd – C13th: Evolution of Just War principles within Christianity and Islam proscribe excessive 
  military damage 
1868:  Declaration of St Petersburg by European powers outlawing explosive bullets  
  includes agreed principle that only military targets should be considered legitimate. 
1899:  First Hague Convention on Laws of War- article IV (ii) outlaws use of poison gas by 
  great powers (except US) 
1907:  Second Hague Convention- article 23(g) outlaws wanton destruction 
1925:  Geneva Protocol to Hague Convention outlaws chemical weapons 
1948:  Nuremburg War Trials establish scorched earth tactics without clear military  
  purpose are illegal.  
1969:  General Assembly Resolution 2603 states that all military applications of chemicals 
  (including defoliants) is contrary to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.  
1976:  Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of    
  Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) 
1977:  Geneva Conventions on War Protocol I Articles 35 and 55 outlaw widespread, long-
  term and severe military damage to the environment 
1981:  UN General Assembly Resolution 36/150 condemns Israeli canal plan because of its 
  implications for Jordan in the context of their dispute. 
1990:  Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam Resolution Article 3b outlaws military 
  destruction of crops or livestock 
1991:  UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 692 prosecute Iraq government for  
  environmental destruction in invasion of Kuwait.  
1992:  UN General Assembly Resolution 47/37 states that military ecocide is contrary to 
  International Law  
1992:  UN Conference on Environment & Development- Rio Declaration Principle 24 affirms 
  that the environment should be respected in warfare. 
1993:  Chemical Weapons Convention outlaws use and possession of chemical weapons 
1995:  Organization of African Union Conference of Ministers of Health Resolution 14(5) 
  outlaws destruction of crops in war. 
1999:  International Criminal Court Statute 8(2) b (iv) lists excessive damage to the  
  environment as a war crime 
Figure 2. timeline of international law and military ecocide.
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gLobaL SEcUrity: HEaLtH, SciENcE aNd PoLicy  7
Soviets actually cooperated in formulating a draft for what 
would become the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of 
Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques (ENMOD Convention). Moscow, able to 
capitalise on the controversy that had emanated from 
Operation Ranch Hand, initiated the idea of an ‘ecocide 
convention’ and Washington, having terminated the 
strategy in 1971 and then the whole war in 1975, had 
no strategic need to risk the reputational loss of allow-
ing the Soviets to claim the moral high ground. ENMOD 
was adopted by Resolution 31/72 of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1976 and opened for signature the 
following year.
Simultaneous to the negotiation of ENMOD a Protocol 
to the Geneva War Conventions (1977) dealing with eco-
cide was also agreed. Protocol I additional to the Geneva 
Conventions, added in 1977, includes two Articles dealing 
directly with the dangers that modern warfare poses for 
the environment.
Article 35 – Basic rules
3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of war-
fare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.
Article 55 – Protection of the natural environment
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural 
environment against widespread, long-term and severe 
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the 
use of methods or means of warfare which are intended 
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural 
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or sur-
vival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of 
reprisals are prohibited.
By 2016, Protocol I had been ratified by some 174 states 
but notable amongst the non-parties were the U.S., India, 
Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Libya. Parties to the 
ENMOD Convention similarly undertake not to use 
environmental manipulation that would have ‘widespread, 
long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, 
damage or injury to any other State Party’ (Article I). Far 
less universal than Protocol I, ENMOD had, by 2016, 77 
parties (though this does include the United States).
Taken together, parties to the twin ecocide instruments 
are prohibited from attacking, destroying, removing or 
rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of 
the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural 
areas and drinking water supplies. Protocol I is the more 
ecological of the twin instruments since its aim is to pro-
tect the environment from war, whilst ENMOD is really 
humanitarian as is seeks to prohibit the use of the environ-
ment (land, sea, atmosphere or space) as a weapon in war. 
ENMOD is limited by the stipulation that such manipula-
tion of the environment must be ‘widespread, long-lasting 
nature beyond military necessity. International arms con-
trol law can similarly be suggested to proscribe ecocide, in 
principle at least. The 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical 
Weapons (and its effective contemporary successor the 
1993 Chemical Weapons Convention), whilst driven by 
humanitarian rather than environmental concerns, by 
outlawing the military use of toxins, inherently makes 
wilful pollution illegitimate.
That the wanton destruction of buildings and land 
is contrary to international law was confirmed at the 
Nuremberg war trials at the close of the Second World 
War. German General Lothar Rendulic was prosecuted by 
the International Military Tribunal for his command of 
scorched earth raids in Finnmark, Norway when in retreat 
from the Russian army. Rendulic was actually acquitted, 
as the Tribunal accepted that he genuinely believed the 
destruction to be militarily justified, but a precedent that 
such acts could amount to an international crime was, 
nonetheless, established. (Boas & Schabas, 2003, p. 293) 
Another German General, Alfred Jodl, was convicted 
and hanged for several war crimes amongst which was 
culpability for scorched earth in Finnmark for which no 
military justification could be found. The UN War Crimes 
Commission at Nuremberg also confirmed that German 
plundering of Polish forestry constituted a war crime 
(case 7150). Military ecocide was more acute in the War 
in the East but national interest and an early manifesta-
tion of cold war realpolitik ultimately trumped humani-
tarian concerns when it came to prosecuting Japanese war 
crimes. The Tokyo War Crimes Trials did not properly 
address the Japanese deployment and dumping of chem-
ical and biological weapons in Manchuria, largely due to 
the US’s desire to keep such knowledge to themselves and 
out of the hands of the Soviet Union.
Japan’s actions in Manchuria were clearly counter to 
the Geneva Protocol and Hague Convention, but the will 
to implement these instruments was not apparent, as it 
had not been a few years earlier when appeasement saw 
Mussolini’s chemical assault on Abyssinia overlooked by 
the League of Nations in 1935. The effective death knell of 
the Geneva Protocol came when it became apparent that 
the huge advances in chemical synthesis in the 1940s and 
1950s had rendered it redundant by the time an attempt 
came to prosecute the U.S. for Operation Ranch Hand on 
the basis of a 1969 General Assembly request. In response 
to this, U.S. Secretary of State Rogers stated that ‘the 1925 
Geneva Protocol does not cover chemical herbicides’, on 
the grounds that the chemicals used were not known in 
1925 and that their intention was to kill plants not humans.
The simultaneous rise of environmentalism and the 
Vietnam War, however, did prove twin catalysts for the 
emergence of international law specifically dealing with 
military ecocide. In the spirit of detente, the Americans and 
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A further legal milestone for ecocide came with the 
adoption of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) in the statutes of the 
International Criminal Court, which lists as a war crime 
the launching of an attack that may cause excessive damage 
to the natural environment. However, whilst this makes 
individual criminal responsibility for ecocide clearly estab-
lished under an international treaty, the statute suffers 
from the same lack of precision as the Geneva Protocol 
and ENMOD in terms of determining what constitutes 
‘excessive damage’ (Peterson, 2009). Hence, to date, no 
individual or government has been prosecuted specifi-
cally for military ecocide under the Hague Convention, 
ENMOD or through the ICC. A case was presented to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
(a special ad hoc UN court set up to try crimes commit-
ted in the wars of the Yugoslav secession) by the Serbian 
Government against NATO bombing raids in the Kosovan 
War but was dismissed by the ICTY committee on the 
basis that it did not exceed the WLS threshold.
In some other areas of international laws that could 
potentially limit ecocide, military necessity is explicitly 
cited as an exemption. The 1993 Prevention of Major 
Industrial Accidents Convention, for example, does 
not apply to military installations. The Arctic Council, 
an intergovernmental organisation that has produced a 
range of soft and hard laws on environmental and ship-
ping issues covering the region since the mid-1990s, has 
it written into its rules of procedure that military matters 
are off the table.
Reflecting international relations as a whole, early 
1990s international solidarity against Saddam has proved 
to be something of a false dawn for prosecuting military 
ecocide and the efforts of campaigners and UN experts 
have since then have, instead, focussed on improving 
the implementation of existing legislation and devel-
oping new instruments. Through its Environmental 
Cooperation for Peacebuilding programme, UNEP has 
worked with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in seeking to strengthen international laws pro-
tecting the environment during times of conflict. This 
work came together and was showcased in 2009 in an 
International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the 
Environment in War and Armed Conflict on 6 November. 
The event emphasised the need to clarify and enforce 
existing laws and made some particular recommenda-
tions including the following: (1) give greater clarity to 
the ‘widespread, long-term and severe’ (WLS) threshold; 
severe should be taken to mean environmental impacts 
over several hundred square kilometres and long term 
should be considered to be a period of several months 
or over a season; (2) establish new laws to demilitarise 
important ecosystems, which should be determined at 
the outset of conflict; (3) laws should deal with civil as 
or severe’ (‘WLS’) to be deemed illegal but, nevertheless, 
has the advantage of being worded in such a way that 
gives it the potential to outlaw war-making methods not 
yet devised (Roberts & Guelff, 2000, pp. 407–418). Hence 
the sort of defence used by the U.S. against prosecution 
for Operation Ranch Hand under the Geneva Protocol 
would not stand up in the event of a country being prose-
cuted under ENMOD (although this could not happen to 
the U.S. as the Convention does not permit retrospective 
jurisdiction). Indeed, it was international concern that the 
U.S. strategy in Vietnam could evolve to include tactics 
such as deliberate flooding and the manipulation of the 
weather that did much to inspire ENMOD.
Moving on to the early 1990s, the oil and ordnance 
pollution that marked the Gulf War along with the gen-
eral multilateral optimism that permeated international 
relations in the aftermath of the cold war reinvigorated 
international efforts to prevent ecocide. Hence, in 1991, 
the Security Council held Iraq liable for ecocide in their 
Kuwaiti invasion through the adoption of Resolution 687, 
confirming that they were:
liable under international law for any direct loss, dam-
age, including environmental damage and the depletion 
of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, 
nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. (S/RES/687 (1991) 
8 April)
On the basis of this, the Kuwaiti Government filed 
claims against Iraq for damages to its natural resources 
and related public health concerns. The UN Compensation 
Commission (UNCC) was subsequently established by 
Security Council Resolution 692 in May 1991 to adjudicate 
the amount of damages and its Governing Council then 
approved, in December 1996, an award of $610 million 
to Kuwait. Hence, the Saddam government became the 
first and, to date, only international entity to be charged 
for military ecocide.
As a corollary of this Iraqi prosecution, the UN 
General Assembly in November 1992 adopted a reso-
lution on ‘the protection of the environment in time of 
conflict’, which stated that the ‘destruction of the envi-
ronment not justified by military necessity and carried 
out wantonly, is clearly contrary to international law’ (A/
RES/47/37). In further developments, in 1992 and 1993, 
the UN Secretary General submitted two reports on the 
protection of the environment which paved the way for a 
General Assembly resolution (A/RES/49/50) mandating 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to 
encourage the inclusion of their guidelines on the pro-
tection of the environment during conflict in military 
manuals. Consequently, many countries have adapted 
ICRC-drafted principles into the rules of engagement they 
provide for their armed forces.
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gLobaL SEcUrity: HEaLtH, SciENcE aNd PoLicy  9
for the environment in times of armed conflict and coop-
erate in its further development, as necessary’.
This normative evolution of proscribing ecocide can 
actually be traced back to the late cold war era once detente 
had seen humanitarian law advanced and the backlash 
against Operation Ranch Hand had occurred, particularly 
in the context of the Arab–Israeli dispute. Long before 
New World Order optimism had come to inform inter-
national relations, General Assembly Resolution 36/150 
in 1981 condemned Israeli plans to construct a canal 
linking the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea, because of its 
environmental impact on Jordan (as well as the political 
ramifications for Palestinian independence), with only the 
U.S. and Israel voting against. On the basis of this, UNEP’s 
Governing Council adopted several decisions condemn-
ing Israeli actions that had led to environmental dam-
age against the Palestinians and their Arab neighbours 
including reaffirming the General Assembly position on 
the canal in 1983. UNEP have also contributed to this 
normative wave by advancing the idea of environmental 
protection in war. The Disasters and Conflicts Programme 
offers services and advice on: post-crisis environmental 
assessment, post-crisis environmental recovery, envi-
ronmental cooperation for peacebuilding and disaster 
risk reduction which have been utilised in Afghanistan, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. 
UNEP also lead the initiative ENVSEC, linking it with the 
United Nations Development Programme, Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other inter-
governmental organisations in researching the environ-
mental impacts of war. In 2006, ENVSEC carried out a 
scientific assessment of the environmental impact of the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, submitting a detailed 
report just four months after the ceasefire.
Intergovernmental forums outside of the UN system 
have also taken up the cause of exposing and stigmatis-
ing military ecocide. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe have called for the environment to be 
more explicitly cited in Geneva Protocol I and argued 
that conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya 
should have seen prosecutions mounted on the basis of 
that legal instrument (CoE, 2011). This body, representing 
all of Europe bar the dictatorship of Belarus, have also 
called for the strengthening of existing international leg-
islation and for greater funding for UNEP and ENVSEC 
for carrying out of environmental impact assessments on 
conflict zones.
Whilst there has only been the one clear legal ecocide 
case (against Iraq), we can see some small steps being 
taken by other culpable but unprosecuted governments 
to make amends for historical environmental war crimes. 
The Japanese Government, having denied knowledge of 
the chemical weapons used in Manchuria for over half a 
well as inter-state wars; (4) environmental crimes should 
be referable to The Permanent Court of Arbitration and 
be considered for inclusion in the ICC Statutes.
At the same time, a campaign for a more comprehen-
sive and unambiguous UN treaty on ecocide, picking up 
the mantle from Westing and Falk in the early 1970s, has 
gathered momentum over recent years, led by British law-
yer Polly Higgins. The campaign, launched in 2008, seeks 
to end the ambiguities around military (and industrial) 
necessity by establishing ecocide as a crime under cus-
tomary international law (like genocide and torture) and 
opening it up to ICC prosecution. Celebrities, politicians 
and the Morales government of Bolivia are amongst those 
who have pledged their support to this cause which has 
set a deadline of 2020 for the codification of a new treaty 
(Higgins, 2010). Higgins was also instrumental in the set-
ting up of the ‘End Ecocide in Europe’ campaign in 2012 
seeking to get the EU Commission to draft a directive 
criminalising corporate and military damage to the envi-
ronment. The movement was the first to take advantage of 
a new EU participatory democracy scheme, the European 
Citizens Initiative, under which signatures can be gathered 
to trigger new policies to be considered for proposal by 
the Commission in Brussels.
6. Normative progress in curbing military 
ecocide
A UN Treaty on ecocide by 2020 seems like an ambi-
tion unlikely to be achieved, but the popular support 
and attention gathered by the campaign is probably as 
important as establishing a clear legal platform for pros-
ecution. The precedent for enforcing the conventions 
on genocide, torture and (anthropocentric) war crimes 
is pretty limited, but the (fairly) unambiguous universal 
acknowledgement of these crimes has still made them less 
likely to occur than in the ‘total war’ era of the twentieth 
century. Implementing moral international laws is inher-
ently difficult in a sovereign state system, but few could 
deny that overall progress has been made in advancing 
human rights and environmental principles over recent 
decades. Huge gaps and problems with implementation 
remain, but sovereign states have come to be restrained 
on the basis of humanitarian and ecological values as they 
have crystallised in the form of laws and in the rules of 
looser international regimes. The principle that military 
ecocide is unacceptable has, in line with this, come to be 
much better acknowledged. This has been reaffirmed at 
several high-profile intergovernmental forums, includ-
ing at UNCED in 1992, where Principle 24 of the Rio 
Declaration unambiguously states that ‘warfare is inher-
ently destructive of sustainable development. States shall 
therefore respect international law providing protection 
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10  P. HoUgH
old adversary and remedy a festering environmental and 
health sore. At the same time, the Japanese, as champions 
of arms control on the international stage, felt compelled 
to confront their past demons and make reparation for the 
sins of their grandparents (Frieman, 2004).
It is no coincidence that political ecology rose to prom-
inence at the same time as the backlash against the U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam and the rise and persistence 
of the powerful green social movement since then has 
given impetus to the anti-ecocide campaign. However, 
the green wave has not always advanced the proscription 
of ecocide. The mainstreaming of the ecological agenda 
has sometimes served to weaken its tradition of pacifism 
and even advance the military–industrial complex. The 
controversy stoked by German Green Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer’s backing for NATO in the Kosovan War 
is a case in point. Assigning increased political signifi-
cance to the environment through ‘securitisation’ by gov-
ernments has enhanced the profile of issues like climate 
change on the international political stage but often in 
profoundly anthropocentric, state-centric and militaristic 
ways. Since the 1990s, environmental security has featured 
in the stated foreign policy aims of countries like the U.S., 
U.K. and Russia, IGOs like NATO and been debated at the 
UN Security Council. This, though, has actually been a 
very traditional security discourse driven by the ‘resource 
wars’ thesis that environmental changes, such as increased 
droughts, will trigger political tensions and make wars 
more likely. For these reasons, many ecologists remain 
sceptical about securitisation in spite of the advance of the 
ontological challenges presented by critical and human 
security perspectives in advocating urgent political action 
on environmental issues on the basis of the threats posed 
not to national interests but to people in general or even 
non-human life forms.
However, not all environmental securitisation has been 
of the state-centric and militaristic form and a ‘green tide’ 
continues to advance ecocentric norms in other situations. 
The Netherlands’ 2006 Foreign Policy Agenda acknowl-
edges the potential role that environmental degrada-
tion plays in triggering conflicts but notably goes on to 
declare as one of eight goals a commitment ‘to protect 
and improve the environment’, without the addition of any 
clause indicating that this is another case of valuing the 
environment for instrumental rather than intrinsic rea-
sons (Netherlands, 2006). This ecocentric turn of making 
the environment the referent object of security has also 
been advanced in a different political form in recent years 
outside of the Western World as part of the ‘new left’ wave 
in Latin America from the late 2000s. One expression of 
the critical stance on Western capitalism and focus on 
indigenous people that marks this political movement has 
been the empowerment of nature. In 2008, Ecuador’s new 
century, in 1997 finally entered into talks with the Chinese 
Government over how to remedy the damage. This led 
to a 1999 memorandum committing Tokyo to a plan to 
locate and destroy some 700,000 abandoned weapons at 
a cost of over $500 million (BBC, 2004). Whilst accepting 
no international legal liability for Operation Ranch Hand, 
President Ford in 1975 ratified the Geneva Protocol and 
issued Executive Order 11850, renouncing the military 
use of herbicides ‘as a matter of national policy’. Thirty 
year on the U.S. position, articulated in response to a 
persistent campaign by Vietnam War victims by Judge 
Weinstein, was that ‘there is no basis for any of the claims 
of plaintiffs under the domestic law of any nation or state 
or under any form of international law’ (USDC, 2005, p. 
233). However, the fact that U.S. war veterans suffering 
from dioxin exposure have received compensation from 
the chemical manufacturers for injuries inflicted and 
international support for the Vietnamese victims made 
this a difficult position to sustain and maintained pressure 
on Washington. Hence in 2012, whilst still not accepting 
liability, the U.S. initiated a clean-up of ecological dam-
age by dioxin in Vietnam. Washington gave $43 million 
to two American firms working in conjunction with the 
Vietnamese Defence Ministry in an operation Hanoi hope 
to complete by 2020. Partial atonement was also appar-
ent in 2012 when the U.S. returned to Subic Bay in the 
Philippines in preparation for the reopening of the naval 
base in 2015. In re-establishing military relations with 
their former colony, the Americans were now cooperat-
ing with a government party to MARPOL and not having 
to accept being literally ‘crapped on’ as a price of their 
protection. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority now 
provides Philippine oversight of the U.S. naval presence 
and has helped highlight concerns at the dumping of waste 
and even hosted maritime pollution conferences.
Realpolitik could still be said to underpin these cases of 
atonement since twenty-first-century U.S. foreign policy 
still values South-East Asian influence and a flat-lining 
Japanese economy cannot ignore the resuscitating possi-
bilities offered by its growing neighbour, but moral pres-
sure has undoubtedly played a part. Global civil society has 
been highly vocal with groups like the Alliance for Bases 
Clean Up (ABC) (formerly known as the People’s Task 
Force for Bases Clean Up (PTFBC)) and the Vietnamese 
Association of Victims of Agent Orange (who have led 
the legal campaign) presenting the U.S. with a reputa-
tional incentive to act. The Manchuria case presents a clear 
illustration of how normative forces can influence govern-
ments both by shaming and encouragement. The Chinese 
came to throw their weight behind the Chemical Weapons 
Convention by recognising that abandoning their own 
stockpile (a condition of ratification) would be a price 
worth paying in order to secure a moral victory over their 
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Carson’s critique and restricted the use of DDT in the 
1960s, even though the use of the organochlorine as a 
pesticide had been successful in increasing food yields. 
Human co-responsibility and a respect for non-human 
life sometimes supersede economic and government 
self-interest in democratic domestic governance, because 
people demand that to be the case. In several countries, 
rights comparable to those enshrined for humans have 
been granted to other species, such as with apes (in New 
Zealand and Spain) or dolphins (in India). New Zealand 
has also seen this status granted to inanimate elements 
of nature with the Wanganui River in 2014 granted legal 
personality in the culmination of a campaign by the Iwi 
Maori dating back to the nineteenth century.
The maturation of politics in this way can also be 
observed at the global level as the globalisation of ideas and 
ethics advances, aided in particular by global civil society 
and global epistemic communities of transnational experts 
usually working within the UN system. Sociologists Inoue 
and Drori, in an empirical analysis of global health policy, 
observe that this political arena has evolved in a process of 
‘discursive sedimentation’ in which a ‘right to health’ for 
all has gradually begun to emerge after centuries of inter-
national policy driven by self-interest or charity (Inoue 
& Drori, 2006, p. 211). Charity, fear and commercialism 
persist as values underpinning the motivations of actors 
in the global health world, but a rights-based approach has 
gradually been built on top of this and is now the foremost 
culture evident in the discourse of the WHO and NGOs 
like MedAct and Medecins Sans Frontier. In general, the 
existence of ‘global ethics’ can be seen in the develop-
ment of human rights law and in many other dimensions 
of global law and policy. The reform of the World Bank, 
from being an advocate of ‘unreconstructed liberalism’ 
into a more socially oriented set of institutions, is a clear 
example of such normative change. The World Bank now 
routinely considers the environmental or social cost of 
any development project, as well as its economic viability, 
before granting it its seal of approval. This metamorphosis 
occurred through the development of a different epistemic 
community working within the system of organisations 
making up the ‘bank’, largely in response to pressure group 
and academic criticism. Similar change has occurred in 
the UNDP as the normative shift from advocating ‘pure’ 
economic growth to more human-centred development 
has occurred amongst experts in the field. An emergent 
global discourse has promoted the normative change that 
has seen principles like a right to health and concrete aims 
such as the Millennium Development Goals become 
established on the international stage not directly equi-
table with national interests. Promoted by an epistemic 
community of scientists, lawyers and expert campaigners, 
respected as acting outside of parochial interests by an 
constitution declared that nature had the ‘right to exist, 
persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, 
functions and its processes in evolution’ and mandates the 
government to take ‘precaution and restriction measures 
in all the activities that can lead to the extinction of spe-
cies, the destruction of the ecosystems or the permanent 
alteration of the natural cycles’ (Ecuador, 2008). Whilst 
many countries have cited environmental protection in 
their constitutions, none have done so in such unambigu-
ously ecocentric terms. This ‘rights of nature’ approach has 
also been followed by the Morales government in Bolivia 
where the ‘Law of Mother Earth’ has defended the right 
of nature ‘to not be affected by mega-infrastructure and 
development projects that affect the balance of ecosystems 
and the local inhabitant communities’ (Bolivia, 2011). For 
both of these Andean countries, this idea of environmental 
rights comes from the twin impact of indigenous people’s 
empowerment and a legacy of particularly dire environ-
mental pollution. The rights of long-marginalised indig-
enous Americans (of which Morales is one) have become 
an important domestic political concern aided by greater 
international discourse promoted within the UN system 
by the Trustee Council, Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations, Human Rights Council, Human Rights 
Council and the International Labour Organization. In 
addition, the long-standing problem of ‘industrial eco-
cide’ from pollution by oil in Ecuador and tin in Bolivia 
has heightened environmental concerns beyond that wit-
nessed in most developing countries.
Protecting the environment has sustained itself as a 
populist political strategy in the West since the 1960s and 
continues to attract activists around the world. As Sen’s 
‘entitlements thesis’ convincingly argues, the empower-
ment of people through democratisation or self-deter-
mination leads to the establishment of a right to food or 
health (Sen, 1981). Democratic governments are com-
pelled to be responsive to the needs of ordinary people 
whose security is imperilled, either directly or indirectly 
due to the pressure of the media or other concerned citi-
zens, for reasons of their own self-preservation if nothing 
else. Hence, today health and safety standards, welfarism 
and the notion of ‘social security’ are accepted as inte-
gral to the governance of most developed democracies. 
Increasingly, this thesis is coming to have applicability in 
non-democratic settings also with a clear example being 
the implementation of a range of anti-pollution measures 
by the Chinese Government over recent years in the face 
of public protest at the levels of smog in many cities. We 
can also see evidence from political evolution in many 
developed, democratic states that public demands on gov-
ernment are not always self-serving and anthropocentric. 
Ecocentrism has been apparent in much domestic policy 
on the environment since the U.S. responded to Rachel 
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7. Conclusions
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environmental concerns at times of crisis, as is still reg-
ularly seen in the enactment of emergency measures 
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grounds of national interest, but this is not to say that 
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tinue to be sidestepped in contemporary conflicts but they 
have, nevertheless, greatly advanced in the years since the 
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crimes. Doubtless governments will continue to carry out 
acts of ecocide if they feel they can get away with it, but 
they are increasingly unlikely to get away with it, even if 
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